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Sequestration and theSpes Successionis
William W McBryde and George L Gretton*
Practical and theoretical problems arise from the vesting in a permanent trustee
in sequestration of legal rights, rights under a will and rights under an established
trust. This article considers the meaning ofs 31(5) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act
1985, particularly in the context ofwhat happens after a debtor has been discharged.
The various arguments are analysed in detail, with a consideration of the history
and policy of the law. Although the authors differ on what the current law is, they
both conclude that reform is necessary.
A. INTRODUCTION
When a person is sequestrated, all that person's assets (subject to some exceptions)
pass to the trustee in sequestration1 for the benefit of the creditors. The same is true
of assets which the debtor acquires between the time of the sequestration and the
subsequent discharge, which, in the normal case, will be three years after the date
of the sequestration. But anything which the debtor acquires after the discharge is
his, or hers, to keep. Thus if the debtor receives a legacy, or becomes the beneficiary
of a trust, whether the benefit will pass to the creditors is a question which depends
on timing. In bankruptcy, a great deal depends on timing.
A benefit under a will or trust is capable ofpassing to the trustee in sequestration
even if it is not one which confers present possession. For instance, suppose that
there is a liferent and fee, and the debtor is the fiar. The fee will pass to the trustee
in sequestration even though the liferenter is still alive, and this is true both (a) if
the debtor already had the fee at the time of sequestration and (b) if the debtor
acquired the fee after the sequestration but before the discharge.
* Professor of Commercial Law, University of Edinburgh, and Lord President Reid Professor of Law,
University of Edinburgh respectively. The authors are very grateful for the observations of the
Accountant in Bankruptcy, G Leslie Kerr, who, however, bears no responsibility for their views.
1 There are in fact two sorts of trustee in sequestration, interim and permanent. Vesting takes place
only in the permanent trustee. When we refer to "trustee in sequestration", or "trustee", for short,
we mean a permanent trustee.
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So far, so good. But what about cases where a right under a will or trust vests
after the debtor has been discharged? Can the trustee in sequestration claim it on
the basis that the debtor, before being discharged, had a sort of potential right to it?
Can the trustee argue, in other words, that that potential right was itself part of the
debtor's estate, and so the full right into which it has turned is also part of that
estate?
(1) Some examples
Here are some examples:
(a) Chris is sequestrated. His mother, Anna, dies. Chris is entitled to legitim
from her estate. What happens to the legitim if Anna dies (i) the day before
Chris's sequestration, (ii) the day before Chris's discharge, or (iii) the day
after Chris's discharge?
(b) At the time of his sequestration, Chris is named in Anna's will as the beneficiary
of a legacy. Anna is still alive at this stage. What happens to the legacy if
Anna dies (i) the day before Chris's sequestration, (ii) the day before Chris's
discharge, or (iii) the day after Chris's discharge? Would it make a difference
if Anna made her will after the date of Chris's sequestration, rather than
before it?
(c) Anna in her will leaves property in trust, to be held for Brian in liferent and
for Chris, whom failing Diana, in fee. Anna dies, and is survived by Brian,
Chris and Diana. Even the most casual acquaintance with Henderson on
Vesting2 will reveal that the fee is unvested. Both Chris and Diana are potential
fiars: we do not yet know which of them will at the end of the day actually
take the fee. At this stage Chris is sequestrated. Three years later he is
discharged. One year later Brian dies. The fee now vests in Chris, and Diana
will take nothing. But who actually benefits from this fee?
These questions are difficult. They are difficult in terms of policy: what should
the rule be? And they are difficult in terms of black-letter law: what in fact is the law
of Scotland on these matters? If Chris was sequestrated in 1987, and discharged in
1990, and his mother, Anna, dies in 2020, can it really be the law that, on her death,
Chris's trustee will be able to demand from Anna's executor Chris's share of legitim,
for the benefit ofChris's pre-1987 creditors? And if this is the law (which is uncertain),
should it be the law? These are questions which are far from being only of academic
interest. They are of practical importance. Indeed so important are they in practice,
and so obscure is the current statutory provision, that we suggest that, when the
opportunity presents, the Bankruptcy (Scotland) 1985 Act must be amended.
2 R Candlish Henderson, The Principles of Vesting, 2nd edn (1938).
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(2) What the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 says
Section 31 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 provides for the vesting of the
estate of the debtor as at the date of sequestration,3 the vesting being in favour of
the trustee in sequestration for the benefit of the creditors. Section 31(5) provides:
Any non-vested contingent interest which the debtor has shall vest in the permanent
trustee as if an assignation of that interest had been executed by the debtor and
intimation thereof made at the date of sequestration.
What does this mean? The answer is elusive. There appears to be a logical fallacy
in attempting to vest in a trustee an unvested right. The practical effect, at present,
is that trustees in sequestration are claiming from discharged debtors rights which
vested after discharge but which were unvested and contingent at the date of
sequestration. The trustee in sequestration is likely to found on a passage in McBryde
on Bankruptcy,4 and will claim the money or property acquired by the debtor, even
although the debtor is discharged. The debtor may seek to found on the different
approach indicated by Professor Gretton.5
If it is the case that trustees may claim rights which vest many years after the
debtor's discharge, there are obvious problems for all involved. The trustee will be
uncertain when the sequestration ends, and will need continuing information about
the debtor's circumstances. The debtor may feel that there has been no "new start"
and may suffer emotionally, not to mention financially. There may be emotional
upset in the family at large, since it is likely to be felt that the original truster or
testator never intended such a consequence. Executors and trustees do not know to
whom payment should be made. Paying the wrong person, knowing about the
sequestration, can expose them to personal liability.6
(3) Meaning of "spes successionis"
Though the term is not used in the 1985 Act itself, the case-law refers to "spes
successionis", which means a hope, or chance, of succession. Unfortunately, nowhere
has the concept been fully analysed in Scots law, and this leads to difficulties. The
expression can be used in (at least) three ways. For convenience, we will in this
article refer to these three types by their number.
(1) Rights arising ex lege, such as legitim.
(2) Rights arising under a revocable deed, such as the will of a person who is
alive.
(3) Rights arising under an irrevocable deed, such as an established trust.
3 For the definition of "date of sequestration" see s 12(4) of the 1985 Act.
4 2nd edn (1995) paras 9-150 and 151.
5 "The assignation of contingent rights" 1993 Juridical Review 23 at 32-33.
6 Rankin's Trustee vJ/C Somerville i? Russell 1999 SC 166.
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There is a common theme. In the present context, all these rights or potential
rights are unvested and contingent at the date of sequestration. Once the right vests
there is no longer a spes. The contingencies vary but are usually related, at least in
part, to the survival ofvarious persons. An analysis of the cases shows that sometimes
the term spes successions is used to cover all three categories; sometimes it is
restricted to category (2), potential rights under a revocable deed. It has to be
confessed that category (1), potential legal rights, has undergone little analysis,
and to that extent the views of the authors are based more on principle than judicial
precedent. Nevertheless it is clear that there is more than one type of spes, and
the term may be used with a narrower or a broader meaning. Applying the normal
rules of judicial precedent, there is good authority which favours the broad meaning.
It is possible to give separate labels to each category. For example, category (2)
has been called a spes successionis in destinatione, distinguishable from the special
rights which arise under marriage contracts, which, being onerous, cannot be
unilaterally revoked (i.e. category (3)), but which may create a spes successionis in
ohligatione:
B. HISTORY AND AUTHORITIES
As often with bankruptcy law, there is a history which explains a good deal. We
begin with two contrasting cases decided within a few years of each other: Trappes v
Meredith"1 and McDonald v McGrigor? Both were under the Bankruptcy (Scotland)
Act 1856. In Trappes it was observed that a spes successionis did not transfer to a
trustee in bankruptcy. In McDonald the view was expressed that what was called a
ius crediti (i.e. category (3)) did pass to the trustee.
Trappes is a case with a curious background. It involved the opinion of the First
Division, given to the Court ofChancery, about the effect ofa Scottish sequestration
on rights under an English trust. The case can be understood only with the benefit
of the background of the English litigation."1 Although the opinion of the Court of
Session has its difficulties," the case has always been followed.12
The case was concerned with acquirenda, i.e. assets acquired after bankruptcy.
Mr Graham was sequestrated in 1861. In 1863 his wife (domiciled in England)
made a will, allowing him an annuity, but subject to conditions, including, perhaps
7 P Fraser, Treatise on Husband and Wife, 2nd edn (1876/1878), vol 2 at 1406.
8 (1871) 10 M 38.
9 (1874) 1 R817.
10 Trappes v Meredith (1869) 9 Eq 229; Trappes v Meredith (No 2) (1870) 10 Eq 604, (1871) 7 Ch App
248.
11 See Gretton, "Assignation of contingent rights" at 30—31.
12 Kirkland v Kirklands Tr (1886) 13 R 798; Reid v Morison (1893) 20 R 510; Salomon v Tod 1911 SC
1214.
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surprisingly in view of the date of the will, a forfeiture in the event that her husband
became bankrupt. At this stage Mr Graham had a category (2) spes. Mrs Graham
died in 1864. The annuity was to begin in October 1868, after the death of Mrs
Graham's mother, who had a life interest in the funds. Mr Graham was discharged
in the Scottish bankruptcy in August 1868. The English courts were mainly concerned
with the construction of various provisions which affected the annuity and the fact
that there was an English bankruptcy as well as a Scottish bankruptcy. The end
result was that the annuity did not fall to the husband or his trustee, but on the way
to that conclusion the Court ofChancery sought the opinion of the Court of Session
on the effect of the Scottish sequestration.
The First Division stated:
By the law of Scotland a right or estate in expectancy or spes successionis may be sold
and assigned so as to give the purchaser a good title in a question with the seller to the
right, estate, or succession, when it comes to be vested in the seller. But such right or
estate in expectancy, or spes successionis, is not attachable by the diligence of creditors
of the person in expectancy or entitled to succeed, and would not be carried to the
trustee in his sequestration if he should be discharged before such right, estate or
succession was vested in him.15
The court said that if the right to the annuity had vested before the date of Mr
Graham's discharge, the trustee would have had the benefit of the annuity.14 The
view that rights such as legitim will pass, upon vesting, to a trustee in sequestration,
provided that the bankrupt was not discharged, was confirmed in subsequent cases.15
Because of the opinion expressed by the court (without reasons), the case has been
taken as authority for the proposition that a spes is not attachable by diligence. On
the basis that sequestration is collective diligence, and that what is not attachable by
diligence is not affected by sequestration, the view appears to have been taken that
this spes could not pass to a trustee in bankruptcy.16
13 (1871) 10 M 38 at 40.
14 Not merely sums maturing before discharge, but all future sums payable under the annuity as well,
because it was decided that the annuity "could be now still claimed under the sequestration for the
benefit of Mr Graham's creditors" (at 112).
15 Aikman, Petitioner (1893) 30 SLR 804 and Wishart v Morison (1895) 3 SLT 29.
16 The view that a category (3) spes (which is, of course, unvested) cannot be attached by arrestment is
settled by the case-law. Nevertheless, there may be room for suggesting that a more rational approach
would be that it can be arrested tantum et tale. In Chambers' Trs v Smith (1878) 5 R (HL) 151 there
was an arrestment of a beneficial right which was vested, but which, notwithstanding the vesting,
was subject to a power of variation by the trustees. It was held that the arrestment, though effective,
was subject to the power to vary, even though the power was exercised after the arrestment. This
suggests that there may be a distinction between a vested but contingent right, which is arrestable,
and an unvested one, which is not. The subject is difficult. It is perhaps unsatisfactory if what can
be assigned cannot be arrested at all, even tantum et tale. See also Gibson v Wills (1826) 5 S 74(NE 69).
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A careful reading of Trappes suggests that the court did not express a view as to
whether or not the annuity had vested and, if so, when. The facts are unusual in that
the will was made after the bankruptcy, which created a category (2) spes.]' On the
testator's death a right emerged which was affected by the conditions which attached
to it, with the result that it did not pass to the bankrupt.1S
The second case, McDonald v McGrigor, involved an unvested contingent
right under a marriage contract of the bankrupt's parents, subject to a power
of appointment. The Lord Ordinary, Lord Gifford, said that the bankrupt's right
was not a spes successionis, but a ius crediti, which might be modified, but
which could not be defeated. Trappes was distinguished. On a reclaiming motion
the issue was decided in other ways, but Lord Neaves indicated agreement with
the approach of the Lord Ordinary. The comments were obiter, and it may be
doubted whether they remained an accurate statement of the law after later
cases.
Judges of the Inner House at the end of the nineteenth century were prepared
to classify unvested and contingent rights as being a form of spes successionis, even
when arising under established trusts (i.e. category (3)). That was the view of the
First Division in Kirkland v Kirkland's Trustee.19 This was also the view taken in a
decision of seven judges, Reid v Morison.20 In Reid there was one dissent (Lord
Adam) but otherwise every judge of the First and Second Divisions concurred in
the opinion of Lord Rutherfurd Clark.
In Reid the bankrupt had a contingent right under the trust disposition and
settlement of his father. Vesting did not take place until the death of the widow and
the majority of the youngest child. The court refused to order the bankrupt to assign
what was referred to (even by the dissenting judge) as a spes successionis. Trappes
was followed, and Kirkland effectively overruled on this point. Lord Rutherfurd
Clark said:
Why cannot an expectancy be attached for debt? The answer is simple. It is not property.The law provides the means of reaching the property of a debtor, of whatever kind itbe. It provides none for reaching his expectancies, just because they are not property.We speak of the right of succession. But however well protected that right may be, itis not property in anything. It is a right under which one may become a proprietor. It
can be nothing more.21
17 Note that the wording of s 31(5) of the 1985 Act indicates that under current law the spes mustalready exist at the date of sequestration before it can vest in a trustee. This issue is discussedbelow, pp 139-140.
18 We are not here concerned with the effect of the English bankruptcy which commenced after thedeath of the testator but before the first payment of the annuity fell due. This bankruptcy was
annulled, which had a different effect from a Scottish discharge, a fact which explains much of the
concentration in the reports on the effect of the discharge.
19 (1886) 13 R 798.
20 (1893) 20 R 510.
21 At 512.
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The result was that an "expectancy" was not attached by a sequestration.22 His
Lordship also went on to say: "I do not think that an expectancy is a right or power
or interest in property."23 There can be an agreement to convey the chance, but
nothing is thereby conveyed. There is in the opinion a distinction drawn between
expectancy on the one hand, and property on the other.
The stimulus for change in the law came in 1910, with the Cullen Report.21 The
Committee found that the existing rule was regarded as unfair to creditors. A bankrupt
holding an unvested fee could turn that right into money by selling it on the market.25
Why should not his trustee be able to do the same? Accordingly the Committee
recommended that:
[W]here, under the will or settlement of a person deceased, or under a marriage
contract or other deed, instrument, or writing of an irrevocable nature, the bankrupt
has any spes successionis or non-vested contingent right of succession or interest in
property, such spes successionis or contingent right should be available to the trustee
in his sequestration.
. .
.2fi
The Committee heard evidence about the idea that transfer of the spes should
be at the discretion of the court, but took the view that such a rule would be uncertain
and arbitrary in its operation.2. One or two witnesses also mentioned the possibility
22 Reid left open, but did not decide, the possibility that a court might refuse to allow the bankrupt his
discharge except on condition of assigning any spes. Such a possibility would, in a functional sense,
but not a formal sense, be similar to a rule transferring the spes to the trustee, or requiring the
bankrupt to assign it to the trustee. But in practice this possibility was ignored. See also Obers v
Paton's Trs (1897) 24 R 719 and Aikman, Petitioner (1893) 30 SLR 804. In Obers the decision in
Reid was distinguished on the ground that a debtor is not entitled to do any act in relation to a spes
which might prejudice his creditors, e.g. gratuitously to discharge legitim. The reason was that the
spes might vest before the debtor's discharge from sequestration.
23 At 514.
24 Report of the Committee on Bankruptcy Law of Scotland and its Administration (Cd 5201) 1910,
Brit Sess Papers, IX 607. William J Cullen was the editor of the third edition (1903) of H Goudy,
Treatise on the Laie ofBankruptcy in Scotland, and also assisted Goudy with the preparation of the
second edition (1895). He was Sheriff of Fife and Kinross. (See 1926 SLT (News) 1, which has a
slight inaccuracy.) In 1909, when the Committee was still sitting, he was appointed to the Court of
Session bench. Another notable member of the Cullen Committee was Thomas A Fyfe, Sheriff-
Substitute of Lanarkshire, who was to be the editor of the fourth edition (1914) of Goudy's book.(See 1928 SLT (News) 81.)
25 See para 27. However the Cullen Committee may not have fully considered the implications of
Obers v Paton's Trs (1897) 24 R 719 as stated above in note 22. (Aikman, Petitioner (189.3) 30 SLR
804 may also be cited in this connection.) The decision in Obers is actually rather important. It
means that even if a spes does not pass to the trustee, the trustee does have the assurance that it
will remain intact, so that if it matures into a vested right before the debtor's discharge then the
benefit will enure to the creditors. The effect of Obers was a sort of half-way-house: the spes
does not pass to the trustee but, on the other hand, the debtor cannot benefit from it, prior to his
discharge.
26 Para 29. At the beginning of para 27 it is remarked that this is the "most important" of the proposals
for reform that had been put to the Committee.
27 Para 30.
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of transferring to the trustee potential legitim claims,2s but the Report did not discuss
this idea and did not include it as a recommendation.
This impetus for reform was strengthened by a case decided the following year,
Salaman v Tod,29 in which, under the provisions of the English Bankruptcy Act
1883, a spes successionis in a Scottish trust was held to vest in an English trustee in
bankruptcy. At the date ofbankruptcy the bankrupt was aged twenty-one, and had a
contingent right to the fee of the residue of his father's estate. Vesting was postponed
until the age of twenty-five (i.e. category (3)). There being no vesting, the Lord
Ordinary, Lord Skerrington, said that the bankrupt had "nothing more than a spes
successionis or protected right of succession".5" That such a right did not pass to a
trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1856 was "trite law".31
He refused to give the English trustee higher rights than a Scottish trustee. On a
reclaiming motion the First Division applied the English statute which defined
property as including "every description of estate, interest, and profit, present or
future, vested or contingent
. .
.". The trustee had acquired the spes successionis,
which a Scottish trustee could not. Lord Mackenzie did refer to two meanings of
spes successionis which correspond to the distinctions between categories (2) and
(3). As the case involved category (3), it was unnecessary for the trustee to argue
that there was vesting in him of a "pure" spes successionis, such as a hope to benefit
under the will of a person still alive.
Lord Kinnear referred to the policy differences which were for the legislature:
should a spes pass to a trustee or not? The answer was different in England and
Scotland. But not for long. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 changed the law,
precisely as proposed by the Cullen Committee, and indeed almost in the same
words. The definition of "property" and "estate" in s 2 of the Act included "any non-
vested contingent right of succession or interest in property conceived in favour of
the bankrupt under the will or settlement of any person deceased, or under marriage
contract, or under any other deed, instrument or writing of an irrevocable nature".
The whole "property" of the debtor vested in the trustee by the act and warrant.32 In
the case of moveable property this was to the same effect as if actual delivery or
possession had been obtained, or intimation made at the date of sequestration. The
trustee was given a power to insure the bankrupt's life to assist the realisation of any
non-vested, contingent right or interest which was vested in the trustee, or to prevent
the value of the spes being lost by the death of the bankrupt. Compulsory medical
examination of the bankrupt was possible." The idea was that a trustee would sell
28 See e.g. paras 3872, 3876 and 4904-4909 of the transcript of evidence.
29 1911 SC 1214.
30 At 1217.
31 Ibid.
32 Section 97.
33 1913 Act, s 78. See also H Goudy, Bankruptcy, 4th edn (1914), 312.
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the rights of the bankrupt. Property vesting in the bankrupt after the date of
sequestration, but before discharge, could be acquired by the trustee.34 The possibility
of the trustee waiting around after discharge of the bankrupt to acquire rights then
vesting in the bankrupt, was not likely to arise.
It will have been noted that under the 1913 Act vesting was confined to rights
under irrevocable wills, settlements or marriage contracts. The phrase "any other
deed", etc would presumably have been construed subject to the eiusdem generis
rule. In other words the 1913 Act applied to category (3) potential rights which
existed at the date of sequestration. Category (1) and (2) potential rights did not
pass to the trustee. As far as those categories were concerned, the law remained as it
had been before 1913.
C. THE CURRENT LAW
All this was changed, and the law thrown into confusion, by the Bankruptcy (Scotland)
Act 1985. The Act was passed "to reform the law of Scotland relating to sequestration
and personal insolvency". So there is no presumption that it did not intend to change
the law. Section 31(5) has been quoted above. It vested in a permanent trustee
"[a]ny non-vested contingent interest". The limitations to wills, settlements, marriage
contracts and other irrevocable deeds have disappeared. The reference to "property"
has disappeared. There is added a reference to vesting "as if an assignation of that
interest had been executed by the debtor and intimation thereof made at the date of
sequestration". This raises questions as to whether the "interest" must be capable of
both assignation and intimation.
Why were the changes made? The Scottish Law Commission Report on Bank-
ruptcy, which preceded the 1985 Act, is of little assistance.35 The draft Bill has a
clause in the same terms as s 31(5).3ß There is a note to the clause: "The provision
may be useful where any such interest vests (by purification of the contingency)
after the date of the debtor's discharge." This appears to imply that the trustee may
indeed be waiting around after the debtor's discharge to catch the bounty which
falls to the debtor. The text of the Report does not discuss the issue, despite a
heading which refers to contingent rights ofproperty.37 The provision which enabled
a trustee to insure the life of the bankrupt and compel medical examination was
regarded as "excessive" and was not re-enacted.!s But the much more significant
changes are not explained.
34 1913 Act, s 98(1).
35 Scot Law Com No 68, 1982.
36 Clause 30(6), Report at 434
.37 At 162-164, paras 11.18-11.21.
38 At 143, para 10.10.
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Section 31(5) uses the word "interest" without reference to "property" or "estate".
It will be recalled that in Reid six judges treated a spes successionis as not being
property. A spes successionis in any of its senses is non-vested and contingent. Can
it be an "interest"? On this views may differ. In this context the word "interest" has
been treated by a Temporary Sheriff Principal as meaning "a legal concern in a
thing or in a property, by having a right or title to make a claim in that thing or
property".39 Perhaps this does not advance matters very much. A "concern" is no
more precise than an "interest".40
There is a stateable argument that what vests under s 31(5) can only be an "interest"
which is capable of being assigned, with the assignation completed by intimation.
The reason behind this approach is that the Act says that a "contingent interest"
vests in the trustee "as if an assignation of that interest had been executed by the
debtor and intimation thereof made at the date of sequestration". A spes under
categories (1) and (2) can be assigned but the assignation cannot be completed by
intimation. A category (3) spes can be assigned and title can be completed by
intimation.41 On the basis of that reasoning, the 1985 Act covers only category (3),
and thus does not materially change the law. No difficulty arises with category (3)
cases.4- The problem arises for categories (1) and (2). How is the assignee to complete
title? How is intimation to be made? In Bedwells ir Yates v Tod4i there was an
assignation of a legacy under a will of someone who was still alive. The assignee
intimated to the executor under the will. After the death of the testator creditors of
the assignor and legatee arrested in the hands of the executor. The court preferred
the arresters. On the intimation point the court held "that intimation could only be
made to the cedent's debtor; that the testator could not be contemplated as such;
39 Ross vHJ Banks <Lr Co Ltd 1998 SCLR 1109 at 1115.
40 The word "interest" is a problematic one. We suggest that it can bear (at least) three meanings. (1)
It may mean "patrimonial interest", i.e. the fact that a person stands to gain or lose from some
outcome. Thus in some types of action there is a distinction between "title" and "interest". An
interest in this sense may be held by one person for the benefit of another. Thus a trustee has an
"interest". (2) It may mean "right" in the very broad sense of "patrimonial right". In this sense most
rights in private law would be "interests". In the law of trusts the term "beneficial interest" is a
familiar one, and here "interest" is being used in this sense. (3) It may mean "real right". Thus in
some statutes the phrase "interest in land" appears to mean a real right in land.
41 See, as an example, where the intimation was in fact ineffective, Browne's Trustees v Browne (1901)
9 SLT 128.
42 The 1913 Act referred to assignation and intimation in s 97(4), but being confined to category (3) noproblem arose, since a category (3) spes is capable of an assignation completed by intimation.43 Dec 2 1819, Fac Dec; this case is not cited by Bell in the fourth edition of his Commentaries,
published in 1821, but he added it to the fifth edition in 1826 (the volume of Faculty Decisionshaving been published in 1825) with a new section of text which commenced: "A legacy is not
capable of assignation during the testator's life. The bequest, at whatever time originally made, isheld to be incessantly renewed till the last rational moment of the testator's life" (5th edn, 2.16).
This text is retained in the seventh edition (same page citation as fifth edition). Bell chose Bedwells
as a case to cite in his Illustrations (1838, vol 2, 445).
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and that the intending executor was not such while the testator lived". Hence, it
appears, there could not be intimation until the testator died. This leads to the
argument that s 31(5) of the 1985 Act can apply only to a spes of category (3).
The contrary argument is that most incorporeal rights can be assigned, unless
delectus personae is involved or the right prohibits assignation.44 There is, therefore,
no barrier to the assignation of a spes successionis. For what it is worth, there may
be a sale and assignation of a chance of succeeding in another's estate. On the
authority of Trappes and other cases45 a spes successionis may be assigned. So a
deemed assignation to a permanent trustee is not obvious nonsense. The words "as
if" do not require that there be an assignation and intimation. The draftsman would
also wish to give the trustee a right which could not be defeated as a result of some
prior unintimated assignation by the debtor, so it was natural to say that the trustee
had the equivalent of an intimated assignation.
(1) A problem of timing
We must now say something about an issue which has, so far, been avoided. Up to
now we have presupposed that the spes (ofwhatever kind) was already in existence
at the time of sequestration. But this need not be so. It might be, for instance, that
Anna makes her will, giving a legacy to Chris, in the interval between his sequestration
and his discharge. (Presumably she is confident that she will not die until after he is
discharged.) This could be either a category (2) or a category (3) spes. Might this
point of timing make any difference?
Under the 1913 Act it made no difference. Section 98 of that Act provided that
all "estate" which the bankrupt acquired after the sequestration but before the
discharge would pass to the trustee, and s 2 of the Act defined "estate" so as to
include a category (3) spes. That was clear enough. But the 1985 Act, in another
infelicity of drafting, changes what was clear into something less clear. The provision
which has been quoted above, s 31(5), deals with estate at the date of sequestration.
It is the next section, s 32, which deals with acquirenda. Section 32(6) says that "any
estate .
. .
which
...
is acquired by the debtor
.
.
.
and
. . .
would have vested in the
permanent trustee if it had been part of the debtor's estate on the date of sequestration
shall vest in the permanent trustee". But there is no definition of "estate" and s 32
(unlike s 31) has no express provisions to deal with a. spes successionis. "Interest" is
different from "estate", and it is only "estate" which is caught by s 32(6), at least on
44 Erskine, Institute, 3.5.2; Traill it Sons v Actieselskabat Dalbeattie Ltd (1904) 6 F 798 at 806 per
Lord Kinnear; Cole-Hamilton v Boyd 1963 SC (HL) 1; Liberias-Kommerz GmbH v Johnson 1977
SC 191; MRS Hamilton Ltd v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland (No 1) 1999 SLT 829 at 834, 835
per Lord Hamilton.
45 E.g. Rothwell v Stuart's Trs (1898) 1 F 81; Browne's Tr v Anderson (1901) 4 F 305; Robinson v
Robinson's Trs 1934 SLT 183.
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a literal reading. This being so, it must be regarded as doubtful whether a spes
acquired in the interval between sequestration and discharge is affected, even if it is
a category (3) spes.
If that inference is correct (and there might be room for doubt), then the odd
consequence would be that the 1985 Act denies to the trustee a spes which would
have passed under the 1913 Act. That is odd because at the same time the 1985 Act
may be (depending on what view is taken) giving to the trustee other sorts of spes
which the 1913 Act would not have given. This is, therefore, further reason for
doubting whether the text of the 1985 Act in this area was given proper consideration.
(2) Not only wills and trusts?
One of the problems with s 31(5) has only been hinted at so far. Its wording is not
confined to rights or interests in succession (unlike its predecessor in the 1913 Act).
The scope of s 31(5) is unfathomable. It has been applied to fishing licences in an
unreported decision by Sheriff Meston,4fi and to a commission fee for the introduction
of a buyer of property.4. One wonders whether it might apply to a spes under a
special destination. Suppose that Morag and Robert are co-owners of a house, with
a survivorship destination in the title. That means that Morag owns half, with a
destination to Robert, and Robert owns half, with a destination to Morag. Suppose
that Morag is sequestrated. Robert buys her half share from the trustee, and the
trustee duly dispones that half share to him. Four years later Robert dies intestate.
Could Morag's trustee now claim half of the property? The argument would be that
when she was sequestrated she had a spes to Robert's share, and that this spes
passed to the trustee. If that is right, the end result would be that Robert's estate
would end up with the half share originally held by Morag, and the trustee would
end up with the half share originally held by Robert. This result seems absurd, but
would apparently ensue from a broad reading of s 31(5).4S
Another difficult area is claims for solatium. Suppose that a person is injured and
later sequestrated. Can the trustee claim for the creditors the right to solatium? If
compensation by way of solatium is paid before the debtor's discharge, it passes to
the trustee.49 But if it is paid after the discharge, what then? The law is less than
clear. In the leading modern case, Coutts's Trustee v Coutts,5" the debtor was injured,
46 Cays 7V, Peterhead Sheriff Court, 19 Jan 1995.
47 Ross \HJ Banks it Co Ltd 1998 SCLR 1109.
48 This result, arising from a broad reading of s 31(5), could be prevented by careful conveyancing: thedisposition by the trustee to Robert ought to be in the form of a disposition by both the trustee and
Robert in favour of Robert of the whole property and not just of Morag's half share. See further G L
Gretton and K G C Reid, Conveyancing, 2nd edn (1999), ch 26.
49 Jackson v McKechnie (1875) 3 R 130.
50 1998 SC 798. Also reported at 1998 SCLR 729, with a commentary by one of the present authors at
741.
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and later, on 13 June 1990, was sequestrated. He raised an action for damages,
including solatium, on 26 February 1992. He was discharged from his bankruptcy
on 13 June 1993, and soon thereafter the action was settled by a payment. It was
held that he was obliged to pay this money to his trustee. The basis of the decision is
that the right to solatium vests when the action is raised,51 and therefore if it is
raised before discharge it vests in the trustee under the acquirenda provisions of the
1985 Act. The decision might suggest that the right to compensation is not a "non-
vested contingent interest" as at the date of sequestration, for if it were such an
"interest" the trustee would not have needed to base his position on the acquirenda
provisions. However, this may just be an accident of pleading. No serious attempt
seems to have been made by the trustee to argue that s 31(5) was applicable.
Accordingly the court says nothing of that subsection.52 However, it might perhaps
be contended that if the court had thought that s 31(5) was applicable it would have
said so.
So the meaning of s 31(5) may have wide implications,51 although there must be
limitations. For example, it would be absurd to hold that the trustee was vested in
the debtor's contingent future reversionary right to any surplus which might emerge
in the event that the trustee was able to pay off all creditors in full. Nevertheless,
our analysis ofspes successionis should not be viewed as the only possible analysis of
interests which may be affected.
(3) Does a trustee in sequestration acquire a right to a spes successionis?
The question in the end is one of statutory interpretation in the light of the background
law, plus considerations of policy. Reasonable minds may differ about the meaning
of s 31(5). The arguments are as follows and the reader must decide which proposition
would be favoured in court.
51 The court expressly states that the right vested in the trustee on 26 Feb 1992. It may, however, be
said that Lord Prosser, while not dissenting, was evidently attracted by the idea that a right to
solatium should not be treated differently from other claims and the right could vest at the date of
sequestration. Lord Caplan was of a different view and made the interesting point that if the right
vested in the trustee, it was difficult to see how a debtor could have a title to sue. This may illustrate
another unintended consequence of s 31(5) attempting the logical fallacy of vesting an unvested
right. The subsection affects title and interest to sue.
52 However, Sheriff Principal Risk, in the court below, said that "a potential claim for solatium which
has not been brought to court does not form part of the estate of the debtor which vests in the
trustee at the date of sequestration". (See 1996 SCLR 1026 at 1029.) But the Sheriff Principal
seems not to have had the benefit of argument on this point, and it was not part of the ratio of his
decision.
53 Various rights which might arise under annuities, pension policies and insurance policies might give
rise to several interesting questions. See, in England, fie Landau [1998] Ch 223; Scientific Investment
Pension Plan Trusts [1999] Ch 53. Royalties payable in the future in respect of scripts written by the
debtor might be another interesting case: cf Performing Right Society Ltd v Rowland [1997] 3 All
ER 336.
142 THE EDINBURGH LAW REVIEW Vol 4 2000
In favour of a trustee acquiring rights to all categories ofspes under s 31(5) is the
very general language of the subsection. It refers to "[a]ny" interest. All forms of
spes successionis are assignable: this has been the law at least since Trappes. A spes
may be assigned and sold by the trustee; and the trustee should be vested in all
assets which have worth, except those which, for policy reasons, the legislature has
clearly decided to exclude from the sequestration process. Intimation of an assignation
is not always necessary.54 There is a difficulty in intimation of potential rights under
categories (1) and (2). The reference to intimation does not, however, remove from
vesting in a trustee a right which would otherwise have vested. The right is transferred
"as if" there had been intimation, whatever that intimation is worth. The effect is
that legal rights and rights under wills, existing at the date of sequestration, can pass
to a trustee. There is an element of lottery in that rights may change. The will may
be altered because a legatee has been sequestrated, for example. People may die in
unexpected sequences with unexpected consequences. There are practical difficulties
arising from this interpretation of s 31(5) and it is thought that these, more than
any detailed consideration of the prior law, will make a court hesitant. But there
are also policy considerations in deciding which rights vest in a permanent trustee,
and which do not. As recognised by Lord Kinnear, the policy is a matter for the
legislature. There is the limitation that the interest must exist at the date of
sequestration. Even if the section appears unfortunately drafted, effect must be
given to its terms.
On the other hand, the argument that a trustee's rights under s 31(5) may be
limited to category (3) rights, because of the reference to intimation, cannot be
easily ignored. The draftsman is presumed to know the underlying common law and
it cannot be intended that a right which was incapable of intimation at, or prior to,
the date of sequestration vested in the permanent trustee. This was the approach of
Temporary Sheriff Principal Wheatley, admittedly in a case which did not raise the
present issue,55 when he referred to the fact that an interest was capable of assigna-
tion and intimation. Also the practical difficulties of a wider interpretation of s 31(5)
cannot be ignored. It appears to be suggested that legal rights could be claimed by a
trustee years—even decades—after the discharge of the debtor. It is unlikely that
this could have been Parliament's intention.56 Questions of policy should not be
disregarded in attempting to ascertain the meaning of a difficult statutory provision.
54 McBryde, Contract, para 17-100.
55 Ross v H J Banks 6 Co Ltd, note 39 above, at 1115.
56 It is important to note that there is a sense in which a sequestration never ends, even though
the debtor has been discharged. Even as and when the trustee himself/herself is eventually dis-
charged, the sequestration has a shadowy continued existence. If some "interest" existed at the date
of sequestration which one day matures into an asset of value, a new trustee can be appointed to
realise it for the old creditors. There is no time limit, other than what may arise due to the long
negative prescription.
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Furthermore, if s 31(5) extends to category (2), an odd consequence ensues. Suppose
that in year one Anna makes a will with a legacy to Chris. In year two Chris is
sequestrated, and in year five he is discharged. If Anna, in year six, tears up her will
and makes another, which is in wholly identical terms, the effect of the will is utterly
changed. For (on the view of s 31(5) now under consideration) if she had died with
the original will intact, the legacy would have passed to the trustee in sequestration.
But under the new (identical) will the legacy goes to Chris. Yet the terms of the will
have not changed. Nor has her intention. Her intention under both wills was that
the legacy should go to Chris. But if the terms of the will have not changed, and the
intentions of the testator have not changed, why should the effect of the legacy have
changed? As Bell says, "the bequest, at whatever time originally made, is held to be
incessantly renewed till the last rational moment of the testator's life". 57
Professor McBryde inclines to the view that the 1985 Act must be regarded as
having changed the law, so that a permanent trustee acquires rights to various forms
of spes. Professor Gretton inclines to the contrary view. But both authors view the
matter as being of some difficulty, and neither is completely confident as to what
the result will be as, and when, the matter is tested in the courts. Both authors agree
that it would be desirable if the doubts were to be removed, one way or another, by
legislation.
D. WHAT SHOULD THE LAW BE?
There is no self-evidently correct approach, in policy terms, to issues of this sort.
Scots law has swung from a position whereby every sort of spes was excluded from
sequestration (the pre-1913 position), to a middle course (1913 to 1985) and finally
to a position where (on one view) every sort of spes passes to the trustee in
sequestration, provided that the spes existed at the date of sequestration. In the
United States the rule is even more anti-creditor than the pre-1913 Scottish position.
Not only is every sort of spes excluded, but even rights of succession vesting more
than 180 days after the bankruptcy are excluded, and can be kept by the bankrupt.5S
57 Commentaries, 2.16. See note 43 above. Scots law has the principle that ambulatoria est voluntas
defuncti usque ad vitae swpremum exitum. ("The will of a deceased remains provisional until the
final termination of life.") See D 34.4.4 (Ulpian), and cf D 23.1.32.3; Stair, Institutions, 3.8.1;
J McLaren, Law of Wills and Succession, 3rd edn (1894) vol 1, 415, para 752. It is on this basis that
D V Cowen has argued, in the context of South African law, that a legacy is not a contingent right
while the testator lives. He inclines to the same conclusion for potential rights to succeed ab intestato
but concedes that the point is not settled: "Vested and contingent rights" (1949) 66 South African
Law Journal 404.
58 US Bankruptcy Code, s 541(a)(5). (Under art 1(8)(4) of the US Constitution bankruptcy is a matter
for federal legislation.) See In re Hicks (1982) 22 BR 243 (Federal Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Georgia). Here property was subject to a life estate to the bankrupt's mother. The bankrupt
held the remainder (the equivalent of the fee) but only contingently. It was held that the remainder
did not form part of the bankrupt estate.
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In South African law the position is similar to the Scottish position under the 1913
Act.59 In German law the decision whether or not to accept a legacy or other succession
right belongs to the person concerned as a "personality right". To take it away would
be a violation of that person's rights as a human being. Thus even during the
bankruptcy itself the debtor can accept or reject, as she or he chooses. In the event
ofacceptance the creditors will benefit, but they cannot compel the debtor to accept.6"
After the proceedings have been closed (which happens after the final distribution
is made), there will (in the typical case61) follow a seven-year period in which the
debtor can keep one half of any succession right which accrues, the other halfpassing
to the creditors.62 Any succession rights arising after the end of this seven-year period
will belong to the debtor absolutely. The possibility of a mere spes passing to the
trustee63 does not arise.
In English law the "property" of the bankrupt passing to the trustee under the
Insolvency Act 1986 is defined as including "every description of interest, whether
present or future or vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, property".64
But there seems to be a distinction between "property" in this broad sense and a
mere "expectancy" or "possibility ofan interest".65 The distinction seems to be between
a contingent interest in something already existing, such as a contingent interest in
an existing trust fund, and, on the other hand, a possible interest in something
which does not exist but which may one day exist. How workable all this is in English
law is not for us to say.
There is evidently a strong case for saying that a contingent or potential right,
which has a present market value, ought to pass to the trustee, even if it is not a
vested right. This argument was forcefully pressed by a majority of those who gave
evidence to the Cullen Committee.66 However, the argument applies chiefly to
category (3), and the recommendations of the Cullen Report deal only with rights of
59 W H Mars, The Law of Insolvency in South Africa, 8th edn by Elmarie de la Rey (1988) at 186.
60 Insolvenzordnung (Insolvency Act) art 35 read with art 83.
61 That is to say, if the debtor asks for, and the Court allows, a Restschuldbefreiung, corresponding
roughly with our concept of the discharge of the debtor.
62 Iiisolvenzordnung art 295.
63 The Insolvenzverwalter.
64 Section 436. The wording is similar to the wording in the Bankruptcy Act 1883 which was considered
in Salanian v Tod, note 29 above.
65 Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, 4th edn, vol 3(2), para 392, and see Campbell (A Bankrupt) [1997] Ch
14. Here a person became bankrupt in 1990, and in 1992 received an ex gratia compensation payment
from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for an assault that had taken place in 1984. It was
held that nothing had passed to the trustee. Curiously, the report is silent as to the possibility that
the payment, when made, should have passed to the trustee under the acquirenda provisions of
s 307 of the Insolvency Act 1986. For the Scottish position in such cases see McBryde, Bankruptcy,
para 9-146. We should add that we have made no attempt to resolve the uncertainties which may
exist in English law.
66 There were, however, some dissenters among those who gave evidence.
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that kind. If there were to be an extension beyond category (3) it would be to category
(1), for legal rights in succession, such as legitim, are indefeasible by will. In theory,
therefore, a potential right to legitim might be regarded as a marketable commodity.
But in practice such rights (unlike category (3)) are not readily marketable,67 so
there is little practical point in giving them to the trustee. (One reason, one supposes,
why a potential right to legitim is not in practice marketable is because the person
from whose estate the claim would be eligible can in practice defeat such a claim by
a variety of devices and, in any event, the valuation of the claim is problematic.)
But if potential legitim is caught, the consequences are strange, and, we would
suggest, unacceptable. For it would mean that if someone with a living parent is
sequestrated, the trustee in sequestration will in effect be deemed the child of that
parent for purposes of legitim, however many years may pass until the parent dies.
We gave earlier an example, and repeat it here. Chris is sequestrated in 1986 and
discharged in 1989. His mother, Anna, dies in 2020. Is Chris's trustee to be deemed
Anna's child for succession purposes, more than thirty years after the bankruptcy?
That may, or may not, be the present law. But we do not hesitate to say that if it is
the law, it ought not to be, for it is surely inconsistent with the spirit and traditions
of Scottish bankruptcy legislation.
What, then, are the options?
The first would be to restore the position as it was under the 1856 Act. That was
unfavourable to creditors, and we agree with the Cullen Committee that it was
unsatisfactory.
The second would be to restore the position to what it was under the 1913 Act6S
on the basis that that was a workable approach which represented a reasonable
compromise between competing interests.60
The third would be to revert to the position under the 1913 Act, but extended in
certain ways, for instance to include legal rights in succession.
The fourth would be to follow English law, whatever that is, but without a limit
to succession rights.
In the fifth place, quite different approaches might be considered, such as that of
US law.
Whichever option may be best (and views will inevitably differ), we would make
certain technical observations. The first is that the present wording of the 1985 Act
is obscure, and, as a result, is giving rise to needless disputes. The contrast with the
clarity of the 1913 Act is striking. Reform is needed to make the law clear. In the
67 We state this as a matter of impression. We have not checked the point empirically.
68 It may of course be that the law under the 1985 Act is the same as it was under the 1913 Act. By
using the word "restore" we are not prejudging that question.
69 The authors are impressed by the pragmatic approach of the Cullen Committee, and are not, at the
moment, persuaded that a change from that position can be justified.
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second place, any reform should take into account what we have called, above, the
problem of timing. Thus, if it is decided that a category (2) spes should pass to
the trustee, a further decision has to be made as to whether it makes a difference
when the will was made. The third technical suggestion is that the word "interest"
might usefully be dropped. The fourth is that the reference to a deemed intimated
assignation needs to be considered carefully. If the provision is to extend to rights
which are incapable (at least at the relevant time) of intimated assignation, then the
"deemed intimation" provision is confusing.'0
70 It could be retained but subject to a rider that would apply only insofar as relevant.
